Behind Your Business

Can microlenders serve shareholders and the poor?

THE loans that microfinance companies make may be tiny but their ambitions can be vaulting. Take SKS Microfinance. Already India’s biggest microlender, with 6.8m clients and 5.8m active borrowers in the year ending on March 31st (see chart), it intends to become the world’s largest by 2012, with 15m clients. To fund this growth, it hopes to raise nearly $350m by selling a 21.6% stake in an initial public offering (IPO) which got under way this week.

According to the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), a think-tank housed at the World Bank, the IPO is only the second by a pure microfinance institution, after the offer by Mexico’s Compartamos Bank in 2007. More may follow. CGAP reckons that SKS’s move “should set the stage for future IPOs in the sector.” The omens are good. On July 27th SKS announced that it had raised $64m from anchor investors, including JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, and India’s ICICI Prudential and Reliance Mutual Fund, at the top end of the expected price range. …

In the first in a series of profiles of financial institutions after the crisis we look at PIMCO, a giant fund manager

BILL GROSS has a dual passion for philately and philanthropy. In 2007 he gave to Doctors Without Borders the $9.1m he earned from an auction of his collection of British stamps. He has said he is happy to part with “old friends” for a good cause. But the 66-year-old shows no sign of parting ways with the company he co-founded in 1971, Pacific Investment Management Co (PIMCO), one of the world’s largest bond-fund managers and, since 2000, a unit of Allianz, a German insurer. As co-chief investment officer, he manages PIMCO Total Return, the world’s largest mutual fund with $234 billion of assets. It is as successful as it is big, returning an average 7.5% over the past five years—better than 98% of its peers, according to Bloomberg.

PIMCO itself, however, is changing. Having long marketed itself as “the global authority on bonds”, it recently switched to “your global investment authority”. It is too early to claim that crown. But the asset-management industry is sure to feel the effects of any effort by its most respected—and, by many, most feared—member to diversify its portfolio of offerings into equities, exchange-traded funds, risk hedging, valuation services and more. …

Should the savings banks be embraced by investors, or avoided?

SPAIN’S savings banks, or cajas, have survived for nearly 200 years without the help of shareholders. But lots of these institutions, which are largely controlled by regional politicians, are now short of capital and on the hunt for private investors. A delegation from the Confederation of Spanish Savings Banks (CECA) toured European cities this week, touting what it called the “lighthouse of a new Spanish equity opportunity”.

Bad analogy. A lighthouse warns of dangers, and there are plenty of these in the cajas, chiefly political meddling and a high exposure to dud property loans. The state has already pumped €14.4 billion ($18.7 billion) into the sector, most of it from its Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB). Five cajas failed the stress tests, and will require another €1.8 billion in capital. Another four came close, and may also need to raise funds. …

The latest Big Mac index suggests the euro is still overvalued

Correction to this article

ASK Western policymakers how they intend to squeeze growth from their sluggish economies and most pin their hopes on higher exports. That makes exchange rates an especially sensitive topic. A weaker currency improves the competitiveness of a country by making exports cheaper. It also encourages domestic consumers to switch from expensive imports to domestic goods. The Economist’s exchange-rate scorecard, the Big Mac index, shows that currencies continue to be cheap in the developing world but overvalued in Europe. …

Enthusiasm for Chinese companies abroad but not at home

OF THE many oddities surrounding Chinese stockmarkets, the most glaring has long been the premium mainland investors pay for shares listed domestically over what those same shares trade for in Hong Kong. Now the puzzle is why the premium has disappeared (see chart).

The usual explanation for the existence of the premium ran as follows. A closed capital account and a tightly run financial system left Chinese investors with only three places to put their money: property, with its high transaction costs and manic price moves; bank deposits, offering diminutive interest; or shares, with price moves as big as property but lower dealing costs. That paucity of choices drove shares higher than in places with more options. …